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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Charlie has been a polymath in his scholarship.  Although his primary 
topic has been employment discrimination, he has written on a variety of 
topics within and outside employment law ranging from faithless servants1 
to the Herfindahl-Hirschman index.2  So I decided to ask Charlie for help in 
deciding on my topic for this symposium.  I asked him what his favorite 
article was.  He lamented that friends can be annoying when they force one 
to become introspective (it is always satisfying to annoy Charlie), but 
nevertheless he reported that his favorite article was The World Turned 
Upside Down?: Disparate Impact Claims by White Males.3  I decided to 
make that article the central focus of my contribution to this symposium, 
but expanded the topic a bit to include the rest of his scholarship on the 
 
* Judge Harry A. Spencer Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law.  
Thanks to Bill Corbett, Tim Glynn, Tristin Green, Ramona Paetzold, Stewart Schwab, Mike 
Selmi, and Charlie Sullivan for helpful comments and suggestions.  
 1  Charles A. Sullivan, Mastering the Faithless Servant?: Reconciling Employment 
Law, Contract Law, and Fiduciary Duty, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 777 (2011). 
 2  Neil B. Cohen & Charles A. Sullivan, The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and the New 
Antitrust Merger Guidelines: Concentrating on Concentration, 62 TEX. L. REV. 453 (1983). 
 3  Charles A. Sullivan, The World Turned Upside Down?: Disparate Impact Claims by 
White Males, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1505 (2004) [hereinafter Sullivan, Upside Down]. 
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disparate impact doctrine. 
The main theme of this article is that Charlie makes us think about 
things in new and interesting ways.  This will not be an article that attempts 
to survey and integrate Charlie’s views about disparate impact across all his 
articles on the topic.  Instead, it will be a series of riffs on ideas that Charlie 
has raised in the area.  Charlie is such an insightful and provocative scholar 
that many riffs are possible; I will limit myself to a few. 
Charlie began thinking about disparate impact in 1975 almost as soon 
as it had emerged as a concept.  Four years after the seminal case Griggs v. 
Duke Power Company,4 he noodled5 about how the recently enacted South 
Carolina Human Affairs Law would be interpreted and, as part of that, he 
considered Griggs.6  In the first section of this article, I will recount how 
incredibly prescient Charlie was in that article. 
Then, after a break (of about 30 years, but who’s counting?), he 
published his favorite piece on this or any topic, The World Turned Upside 
Down.7  In that article and others,8 he reviewed the various theories that 
have been forwarded to rationalize the disparate impact concept.  In 
Section II, I will talk about the interesting problems presented by the theory 
(or, maybe better, non-theory) of disparate impact. 
A couple years later, Charlie published Disparate Impact: Looking 
Past the Desert Palace Mirage.9  The central claim in this article was that 
disparate impact is a powerful anti-discrimination tool, better in many ways 
than disparate treatment.  He encouraged plaintiffs to use it more often.  In 
Section III, I will not only agree with Charlie, but double down on his 
claim. 
Most recently, Charlie published Employing AI.10  The question he 
addressed in this article was what does thinking about artificial intelligence 
tell us about disparate impact.  (He also asked what it tells us about 
disparate treatment, but that is not the topic here.)  In Section IV, I focus on 
one of his main conclusions: employment outcomes driven by AI, almost 
 
 4  401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
 5  I discovered at the symposium that this word was used by Charlie and his good 
friend, Mike Zimmer, when they thought something was worth thinking about. 
 6  Charles A. Sullivan & Michael J. Zimmer, The South Carolina Human Affairs Law: 
Two Steps Forward, One Step Back? (pts. 1 & 2), 26 S.C. L. REV. 1 (1974), 27 S.C. L. REV. 
1 (1975) [hereinafter Sullivan & Zimmer, Two Steps Forward]. 
 7  Sullivan, Upside Down, supra note 3. 
 8  See Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 
47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 911, 964–66 (2005) [hereinafter Sullivan, Mirage]; Sullivan, 
Upside Down, supra note 3, at 1521–23. 
 9  Sullivan, Mirage, supra note 8. 
 10  Charles A. Sullivan, Employing AI, 63 VILL. L. REV. 395 (2018). 
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by definition, will be correlated with some sort of business necessity 
because that is what AI does.  But AI correlates in a particularly complex, 
effective, and often, obscure way.  So, Charlie asks, should we think about 
bare correlations as business justifications differently?  Charlie’s answer, 
by my lights right again (as usual for Charlie), is that yes, we probably 
should.  I agree again, but add some of my own thoughts and musings. 
Finally, in Section V, I return to Charlie’s favorite article, The World 
Turned Upside Down.  The basic question he addressed there was whether 
disparate impact claims by Whites and males should be cognizable under 
Title VII.  Charlie’s clear opinion was that the doctrine should not be 
available to White and male plaintiffs, but he somewhat reluctantly 
concluded that it must be available, otherwise the whole doctrine would be 
in constitutional jeopardy.  In Section V, I focus on an issue Charlie raises 
in that article: just how many more claims would we expect to see if 
disparate impact were expanded to cover such claims?11 
II.  IN THE BEGINNING . . . 
First, an observation: Charlie really was there at the beginning.  
Although there were glimmers earlier, disparate impact doctrine really 
began in 1971 with Griggs.  Charlie was there practically at birth; he 
published his first article on the topic in 1975.  For most of us in the field, 
we have only known disparate impact from the time of its adolescence, or 
for some perhaps even its adulthood.  But Charlie was practically one of 
disparate impact’s midwives.  For context, compare it with another area he 
has written in: antitrust.  (See Figure 1 below.)  Even Charlie probably does 
not personally remember much about the details of its birth in the Sherman 
Antitrust Act of 1890,12 or the Clayton Act in 1914,13 or whenever you 





 11  Charlie published one other article focused on disparate impact in addition to the 
four mentioned in the text: Charles A. Sullivan, Ricci v. DeStefano: End of the Line or Just 
Another Turn on the Disparate Impact Road?, 104 NW. L. REV. 411 (2010).  This was a 
careful, early analysis of Ricci.  Charlie’s answer to the question in the title, correct by my 
lights, was that Ricci was just another turn in the road.  The case was definitely interesting, 
but because of its odd setting and its density, it was unlikely to have broad impact.  Because 
the case was such a cul-de-sac, I do not discuss this article here. 
 12  Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 210 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2018)). 
 13  Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–
27 (2018)). 
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Figure 1: The Lifespan of Disparate Impact, Antitrust, and Charlie’s 
Scholarship on Each 
An amazing thing about Charlie’s first article on disparate impact in 
1975 is just how prescient he was about the kinds of issues that would 
arise.  For example: 
• He says that Griggs (in combination with McDonnell Douglas)14 
maybe approves, or at least holds open the possibility, that a cause 
of action for discrimination could be made out even without 
identifying a specific employment practice, by comparing the 
composition of an employer’s workforce to demographic 
statistics.15  Note that this is two years before Teamsters16 and 
Hazelwood,17 the seminal cases introducing the systemic disparate 
treatment theory of discrimination.  So he was right, just not about 
the theory being a part of disparate impact doctrine. 
• He points out that extending disparate impact analysis to the Equal 
Protection Clause would cause problems that are not present in 
cases limited to the employment discrimination statutes.18  This 
was a year before Washington v. Davis,19 which held that disparate 
impact analysis was not cognizable under the Equal Protection 
Clause. 
• He discusses whether a factor that an employee can voluntarily 
comply with can be attacked using disparate impact,20 predicting 
Spun Steak21 (requiring bilingual employees to speak English) and 
 
 14  McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
 15  Sullivan & Zimmer, Two Steps Forward, supra note 6, at 13–14.  
 16  Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). 
 17  Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977). 
 18  Sullivan & Zimmer, Two Steps Forward, supra note 6, at 32–34. 
 19  426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
 20  Sullivan & Zimmer, Two Steps Forward, supra note 6, at 24–26. 
 21  Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1487 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that an 
English-only rule with a disparate impact against employees of Mexican origin did not 
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Lanning22 (requiring people to train to run 1.5 miles in 12 minutes) 
by about 20 and 30 years, respectively.23 
• He discusses the problem of just which members of the protected 
class should be entitled to a remedy after a disparate impact case is 
made out.  What about especially disloyal employees, as in 
McDonnell Douglas?  Or ones who would not have been hired 
anyway for other reasons?24  Again, this was years before the two-
stage liability-then-remedies concept was developed.25 
All in all, it was an amazingly prescient article. 
III.  SUSAN SONTAG AND THE THEORY OF DISPARATE IMPACT 
Charlie discussed the theory of disparate impact in some of his 
articles,26 as have I27 and many others.28  But none of the theories have been 
widely accepted; all have flaws.  Marcuse famously said that Susan Sontag 
could make a theory out of a potato peel.29  Unfortunately, no Susan Sontag 
 
violate Title VII because bilingual employees could voluntarily comply with the rule). 
 22  Lanning v. SEPTA, 308 F.3d 286, 292 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that an employment 
test requiring applicants to run 1.5 miles within 12 minutes that had a disparate impact 
against women was not a violation of Title VII because most women would be able to 
comply with the requirement with moderate training). 
 23  This issue also arose under a later-enacted statute, the Americans with Disabilities 
Act (ADA).  Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
12101–12213 (2018)).  In three 1999 decisions, the Supreme Court held that individuals 
who had limitations that could be corrected through a medical or physiological intervention 
did not qualify as “individuals with a disability” under the ADA.  These holdings were later 
overturned by the 2008 Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act (ADAAA).  For a 
discussion, see CHARLES A. SULLIVAN & MICHAEL J. ZIMMER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 450–51 (9th ed. 2017).  Nevertheless, the issue still has 
resonance after the ADAAA.  See Morriss v. BNSF Ry. Co., 817 F.3d 1104, 1109 (8th Cir. 
2016) (holding that obesity did not qualify as an impairment under the ADA). 
 24  Sullivan & Zimmer, Two Steps Forward, supra note 6, at 22–27. 
 25  See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 361–62 (1977) (describing and 
approving the two-stage remedial process). 
 26  See, e.g., Sullivan, Mirage, supra note 8; Sullivan, Upside Down, supra note 3; 
Sullivan & Zimmer, Two Steps Forward, supra note 6. 
 27  Steven L. Willborn, The Disparate Impact Model of Discrimination: Theory and 
Limits, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 799 (1985). 
 28  See, e.g., JOSEPH FISHKIN, BOTTLENECKS: A NEW THEORY OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 
(2014); Alfred W. Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the 
Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59 (1972); Owen M. Fiss, A 
Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235 (1971); George Rutherglen, 
Disparate Impact Under Title VII: An Objective Theory of Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REV. 
1297 (1987); Noah D. Zatz, Disparate Impact and the Unity of Equality Law, 97 B.U. L. 
REV. 1357 (2017). 
 29  Vivian Gornick, She Made Thinking Exciting: The Life and Work of Susan Sontag, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/21/books/review/sontag-
her-life-and-work-benjamin-moser.html (reviewing BENJAMIN MOSER, SONTAG: HER LIFE 
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has arisen to solve the potato peel of disparate impact. 
Charlie has a standard discussion of the theory of disparate impact 
going through the list of possibilities.  Disparate impact could be intended 
to ferret out difficult-to-prove intentional discrimination.  Or it could be a 
way of limiting the temporal reach of past de jure discrimination or, more 
broadly, any type of past discrimination or subordination.  In Griggs, for 
example, disparate impact limited the damage from unequal educational 
opportunities.  Or even more broadly, perhaps disparate impact is intended 
to remove all unnecessary barriers to human advancement, to prohibit 
obstacles that are not firmly tethered to ability to do the job.  Like most of 
us, Charlie does not find any of the theories convincing.30 
Disparate impact presents a special case for discrimination theories.  
As Charlie has said31 and as others in this symposium have noted,32 
generally we begin with a theory about discrimination and then we develop 
methods of proof.  For example, a central theory in discrimination law is 
that intentional discrimination on prohibited bases was the main target of 
Title VII.33  From there, various methods of proof have been developed: 
McDonnell Douglas, mixed motives, systemic disparate treatment.  A 
curious thing about disparate impact is that it sings that tune backwards, 
especially after 1991.  The 1991 amendments to Title VII specify a method 
of proof for disparate impact cases without so much as a feint towards an 
underlying theory.34 
In a backhanded way, this raises the issue of just how important a 
theory is anyway.  What function does a theory serve?  The standard 
response is that theories work backwards by rationalizing a body of law 
and, more importantly, work forwards to help predict future directions.35  
Given this, Charlie’s Upside Down article is an example of the problems 
that arise when a theory is absent or uncertain.  Just how are we supposed 
to decide (or predict) whether Whites and males ought to be able to bring 
 
AND WORK (2019)).  Sontag was a well-known public intellectual at the turn of the 21st 
century.  Marcuse did not say this as a compliment. 
 30  See generally Sullivan & Zimmer, Two Steps Forward, supra note 6. 
 31  Sullivan, Mirage, supra note 8, at 913. 
 32  See William R. Corbett, Explorations with Charlie Sullivan: Theorizing a Different 
Universe of Employment Discrimination, 50 SETON HALL L. REV. 1283 (2020). 
 33  For an early, important statement of this oft-stated theory, see Paul Brest, Foreword: 
In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1976). 
 34  Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105 (1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-2(k)). 
 35  At a deeper level, a well-theorized law is more likely to be perceived by the public to 
be sensible, fair, and worthy of support.  See William R. Corbett, Babbling About 
Employment Discrimination Law: Does the Master Builder Understand the Blueprint for the 
Great Tower?, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 683, 689–93 (2010). 
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disparate impact cases if we have no theory? 
In a case like disparate impact, the response might be that we are 
better off without a theory.  The statute provides a proof structure, so just 
apply it.  On Charlie’s question about disparate impact claims by White 
males, that approach provides a pretty straightforward answer.  We know 
that Title VII has been symmetrical since 1976 for race and gender;36 the 
1991 proof structure for disparate impact cases can be applied in a 
straightforward fashion to claims by Whites and males; and nothing in the 
1991 act even hints that the structure should not be applied to Whites and 
males.  Q.E.D.37 
But in Upside Down, Charlie interprets the statute differently because 
the Q.E.D. result is “ahistorical and lacking any apparent policy 
justification.”38  The interesting twist here is that Charlie’s result is not one 
that is theory free.  Instead, it just pushes the theoretical analysis up one 
level.  Instead of articulating and relying on a theory of disparate impact 
derived from the statute and case law, the result depends on a theory of 
statutory interpretation.  A straight-up textualist theory of statutory 
interpretation would lead to the Q.E.D. result.  But in Upside Down, 
Charlie relies on a different theory—a purposivist theory.  So at the end of 
the day, maybe it is just not possible to go through life and law without a 
theory, even if it has to be built out of potato peels. 
IV.  DOUBLING DOWN ON DISPARATE IMPACT 
In Desert Palace Mirage, Charlie makes a cri de coeur for disparate 
impact.  His plea is to revive disparate impact, to use it more because it is 
so useful. 
His central claim in Desert Palace Mirage is that the intent-based 
models—individual disparate treatment, especially, but also systemic 
disparate treatment—just are not up to the task when we begin thinking, as 
we have been, about cognitive biases resulting in discrimination.39  Implicit 
bias and other cognition-based causes of discrimination pose two big 
problems for the intent-based theories.  First, the intent-based theories, 
precisely because they are intent based, apply only awkwardly if at all to 
discrimination caused by subconscious biases.  And second, even if 
implicit biases can meet the legal definition of intention, proving causation 
 
 36  McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 279–80 (1976); see infra 
note 60.   
 37  Charlie notes this early in the Upside Down article.  Sullivan, Upside Down, supra 
note 3, at 1506. 
 38  Sullivan, Upside Down, supra note 3, at 1506–07. 
 39  See Sullivan, Mirage, supra note 8.   
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on such bases is exceedingly difficult. 
Very interestingly—Charlie is an interesting guy—Charlie points out 
that the cognitive bias movement and disparate impact are similar in that 
both lessen the moral disapprobation of discrimination, while widening its 
scope.40  But that is not Charlie’s main point and not the one I want to 
focus on here. 
Charlie’s main claim is that disparate impact solves, or at least greatly 
minimizes, the analytical and proof problems presented by implicit 
discrimination.  With disparate impact, the proof is simply that the factor 
had a disparate impact.  We do not care what motivated use of the factor; 
certainly, we do not care about whether the impact was the product of 
intentional discrimination or not.  As a result, we do not care if cognitive 
biases had any role in producing the impact.  These kinds of questions 
about motivation are just irrelevant. 
I agree with Charlie and, in fact, I would double down on Charlie’s 
claim in a few additional ways.  First, in the article, Charlie says litigating 
under disparate impact will require expert testimony to prove disparate 
impact—either about statistics, he says, or about cognitive bias.41  I am not 
sure that is the case.  Sometimes the disparate impact can be proven 
without any expert statistical evidence.  Consider Ricci v. DeStefano42 or 
Connecticut v. Teal.43  In both those central cases, the proof of disparate 
 
 40  Sullivan, Mirage, supra note 8, at 983–84. 
 41  Sullivan, Mirage, supra note 8, at 993. 
 42  Ricci considered examinations administered for lieutenant and captain firefighter 
positions.  The Court reported the evidence of disparate impact: 
Seventy-seven candidates completed the lieutenant examination—43 whites, 
19 blacks, and 15 Hispanics.  Of those, 34 candidates passed—25 whites, 6 
blacks, and 3 Hispanics . . . .  Forty-one candidates completed the captain 
examination—25 whites, 8 blacks, and 8 Hispanics.  Of those, 22 candidates 
passed—16 whites, 3 blacks, and 3 Hispanics. 
Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 566 (2009).  These pass rates meant that the disparities 
easily met the four-fifths rule for proving a cognizable disparate impact.  Despite the paucity 
(maybe absence) of expert testimony on the issue, the Court found and the parties did not 
dispute that a prima facie case of disparate impact had been established.  Id. at 586.  But see 
Joseph L. Gastwirth & Weiwen Miao, Formal Statistical Analysis of the Data in Disparate 
Impact Cases Provides Sounder Inferences than the U.S. Government’s ‘Four-Fifths’ Rule: 
An Examination of the Statistical Evidence in Ricci v. DeStefano, 8 LAW, PROBABILITY & 
RISK 171, 171 (2009) (criticizing application of the four-fifths rule in Ricci). 
 43  Teal considered examinations administered for supervisor positions in the 
Department of Income Maintenance of the State of Connecticut.  The Court reported the 
evidence of disparate impact: 
Th[e] written test was administered . . . to 329 candidates.  Of these 
candidates, 48 identified themselves as black and 259 identified themselves 
as white . . . .  With the passing score set at 65, 54.17 percent of the identified 
black candidates passed.  This was approximately 68 percent of the passing 
rate for the identified white candidates. 
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impact was simple and perfectly sufficient.  No expert testimony was 
required.44  And as for expert testimony about cognitive bias, since proof of 
intention or even the underlying cause of the disparity is not needed, it 
would be the rare case where expert testimony on cognitive bias would be 
relevant. 
This is where I want to double down on Charlie’s analysis.  A 
linchpin of his analysis is that the underlying cause of a disparate impact is 
irrelevant, and that is a major reason it can be a powerful tool.45  And 
Charlie is exactly right that the underlying cause of the disparity does not 
matter, and it does not matter big-time. 
Consider a few implications from Griggs about how little it matters.  
In Griggs, the high school diploma requirement had a disparate impact on 
Blacks.46  That disparate impact may have been caused by discrimination, 
for example, by the employer putting in the requirement to keep Blacks out 
or because the state discriminated against Blacks in educational 
opportunity.  Both of these were probably true—and both were completely 
irrelevant.  Plaintiffs did not have to prove either of those things and it 
would not have been a defense for the employer to disprove either of 
them.47 
Second, this blindness to causation means that a large number of very 
minor causes can be accumulated in a way that disparate treatment does not 
allow and, in fact, even completely unknown causes can result in a viable 
claim.  For example, say that Blacks in North Carolina got fewer high 
school degrees because of the accumulation of ten or twenty or fifty small 
factors—poorer childhood nutrition, fewer words spoken to them when 
small children, weaker teachers, inadequate textbooks, crumbling 
buildings, and so on.  And let us say none of those factors can be proven to 
be “the cause” of the disparity.  With disparate impact, that does not matter.  
We can consider the combined effect of all those factors and that is just 
 
Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 443 (1982).  As in Ricci, the Court found that these basic 
statistics established a prima facie case of disparate impact.  Id. at 448.  
 44  Of course, there was expert testimony in both cases.  But the point here is that the 
testimony was not required in either case to prove disparate impact.  It was used for other 
purposes. 
 45  Sullivan, Mirage, supra note 8, at 1001 (“Whether the ultimate cause [of a disparity] 
was animus, rational discrimination, conscious or unconscious stereotyping, workplace 
dynamics, or workplace culture would not matter [to establish a prima facie case].”). 
 46  Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 n.6 (1971). 
 47  Mike Selmi recognizes this feature of the disparate impact doctrine—that the 
underlying cause of the disparity is legally irrelevant—but makes the interesting point that 
changing perceptions about underlying causes may help explain the Court’s efforts to limit 
disparate impact.  See Michael Selmi, The Evolution of Employment Discrimination Law: 
Changed Doctrine for Changed Social Conditions, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 937, 955–66 (2014). 
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fine.  Note this is not disparate treatment where the plaintiff has to isolate 
one factor—intent—and prove that it is an important factor, at least a 
motivating factor and maybe more.48  There is no need to isolate or even 
consider intent in a disparate impact case.  In fact, let us say that North 
Carolina is utopia and everything between Blacks and Whites is completely 
equal.  (Counterfactual, of course, in North Carolina and everywhere.)  Yet 
despite that, Blacks have a lower graduation rate.  Do we care under 
disparate impact?  No, there is no burden on the plaintiff to explain the 
impact in any way; all the plaintiff has to do is show the disparity.  Again, 
this is not disparate treatment. 
Third, there is not even any burden to show that the factor had any 
impact in the particular workplace.  In Griggs, the employer also required a 
minimum score on the Wonderlic test, which excluded half of all high 
school graduates.49  So let us say, for discussion purposes, that the test 
excluded almost all non-high school graduates and half of all high school 
graduates.  And let us say the Wonderlic test was business justified.  If 
there were one or two Black non-high school graduates who passed the test, 
would their disparate impact claim on the graduation requirement be 
undermined because the high school diploma requirement did not have a 
disparate impact in this particular workplace, even though it did generally?  
The standard model of disparate impact would say, no, it does not matter.  
Plaintiffs do not have to prove the effect in each particular workplace—
rather, they have to prove that the factor would have screened out too many 
Blacks if applied independently of all other factors.50 
In sum, Charlie’s main claim in Desert Palace Mirage is right on 
target.  Disparate impact is a powerful anti-discrimination tool.  It is a bit of 
a mystery why it is used so seldom.51 
 
 48  See Sullivan, Mirage, supra note 8, at 925–38 (after reviewing the history of 
disparate treatment discrimination, concluding that the plaintiff has the burden of isolating 
an impermissible factor as a motivating or but-for factor).  
 49  Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 402 U.S. 424, 430 n.6 (1971). 
 50  See Ramona L. Paetzold & Steven L. Willborn, Deconstructing Disparate Impact: A 
View of the Model Through New Lenses, 74 N.C. L. REV. 325, 356 (1996).  This is not an 
incontrovertible proposition.  See, e.g., Livingston v. Roadway Express, Inc., 802 F.2d 
1250, 1253 (10th Cir. 1986) (disparate impact claim by males fails because plaintiffs failed 
to show a disproportionality in the actual workforce).  But higher authority indicates that it 
is true.  First, Title VII requires focus on a “particular employment practice.”  Title VII, § 
703(k)(1)(A)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2018).  A different result would require 
inquiry beyond the particular factor to investigate other factors simultaneously at play in the 
particular workplace.  In addition, this result is implied by Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 
440, 442 (1982), which holds that an employment practice with a disparate impact is not 
immunized because other factors at play in the workplace may obscure the effect of the 
disparate impact. 
 51  Disparate impact discrimination is less favorable to plaintiffs than disparate 
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V.  ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND STRATIFICATION 
In Employing AI, Charlie considers how artificial intelligence 
challenges (and exposes) our current conceptions of discrimination.  On 
disparate impact, he worries that, by its nature, AI will almost always be 
able to prove business necessity if all that is required is a correlation 
between the challenged employment practice and a good business 
outcome.52  That, after all, is what AI does; it sorts through the available 
data to find the best correlation between qualities an employee presents at 
application and the employer’s preferred measures of a good employee.  
But it is certainly possible that we will have no idea why that correlation 
exists, or even exactly how the AI reached its result.  The computer figured 
it out by itself and it will not tell us.  Even more plausibly, it is possible that 
the reason a factor correlates with a good business outcome is opaque.  For 
example, it could be that the computer discovers that an applicant’s favorite 
kind of music, whether she owns a car, or her zip code predicts 
productivity.53  A solution to this problem is to require more than a mere 
correlation to make out the business necessity defense.  In addition, the 
employer must present a reasonable explanation for why the challenged 
factor leads to a better business outcome.54 
For me, that brought to mind stratification and Susan Sontag.  
Consider this situation: an employer requires a certain score on a test and 
the plaintiff shows it has a disparate impact against women overall.  (See 
Table A.)  But then the employer stratifies the same data and shows that if 
you consider college graduates and non-graduates separately, there is no 
disparate impact against women in either group.  (See Table B.)  Should 
 
treatment discrimination on a number of dimensions, including the lack of a jury trial, 42 
U.S.C. § 1981a(c); more limited remedies, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3); and statutory 
exemptions, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (exempting seniority systems); see also 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-2(k)(3) (exempting drug testing).  But these marginal limitations are insufficient to 
explain the low usage of disparate impact.  See Sullivan, Mirage, supra note 8, at 968–69; 
Elaine W. Shoben, Disparate Impact Theory in Employment Discrimination: What’s Griggs 
Good For? What Not?, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 597, 597 (2004) (suggesting that the reason for the 
under-use of disparate impact is that the practicing bar under-appreciates it).  
 52  Sullivan, Employing AI, supra note 10, at 420–28.  
 53  These examples come from Charlie.  Charles A. Sullivan, Comprehending Causation 
& Correlation, JOTWELL (Aug. 4, 2017), https://jotwell.com/comprehending-causation-and-
correlation/.  A well-known and disconcerting example of this outside of the employment 
context occurred when the father of a teenage girl was surprised to learn that she was 
pregnant from Target marketing.  Target had developed pregnancy predictions, including 
due dates, based on her consumer behavior.  CHARLES DUHIGG, THE POWER OF HABIT: WHY 
DO WHAT WE DO IN LIFE AND BUSINESS 182–97 (2012). 
 54  James Grimmelmann & Daniel Westreich, Incomprehensible Discrimination, 7 CAL. 
L. REV. ONLINE 164, 170 (2017) (arguing that to prove business necessity, employers must 
show that “its model’s scores are not just correlated with job performance but explain it”).  
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that be a defense?  Note a few things.  This is not bottom line and 
Connecticut v. Teal.  Only one employment practice is at issue here.55  But 
it is similar to bottom line in that if you stratify you can get any 
combination of results.56  For example, in this case, a disparate impact 
exists overall, but not in either of the two subgroups.  But you could also 
see a disparate impact overall, but only in one of the two subgroups.  Or 
you could see the converse: a plaintiff using stratification offensively when 
no disparate impact exists overall, but there is a disparate impact against 
one or both of the subgroups.57  Lest this seem insignificant, consider that 
there is almost an infinite number of ways to stratify the overall group—
here I did it by education, but it could be by time, or age, or hair color, or 
height, or whatever.  What to think about this? 
 
Table A: Disparate Impact Overall 
 
 Pass Fail Total Pass Rate Four-Fifths Rule 
Men 400 200 600 0.66  






 55  Connecticut v. Teal involved a situation where an employment test used for 
promotions had a disparate impact against blacks, but a set of other employment practices 
counter-balanced the results of the test so that blacks received their proportionate share of 
promotions.  Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 443–44 (1982).  Thus, the class of cases 
covered by Teal requires at least two employment practices that counter-balance each other.  
In this example, there is only one employment practice.  The “counter-balancing” occurs by 
considering the single employment practice’s adverse impact across different populations. 
 56  This situation and Teal give rise to a common misunderstanding about these types of 
two-factor situations.  In Teal, for example, it seems only logical that if the employment test 
had a disparate impact against blacks but when other factors were applied there was no 
disparate impact, then the other factors by themselves must not have had a disparate impact 
against blacks, indeed, they must have had a disparate impact against whites.  Charlie and I 
have both used our “common sense” to make this incorrect claim.  Sullivan, Upside Down, 
supra note 3, at 1511 (“logically” in Teal since the test had a disparate impact against blacks 
but promotions overall did not, the other factors used had to have a disparate impact against 
whites); Willborn, supra note 27, at 829 (“One is certain when a system has a disparate 
impact that an element or combination of elements of that system also has a disparate 
impact.”).  But that is simply not the case.  This seems to violate “common sense” but it is 
true; there is good reason that the example illustrated in Tables A and B is referred to as an 
aggregation paradox.  See, e.g., Clifford H. Wagner, Simpson’s Paradox in Real Life, 36 
AM. STATISTICIAN 46 (1982). 
 57  For a detailed discussion of the possibilities and legal responses to them, see 
Paetzold & Willborn, supra note 50, at 336–42, 387–97. 
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Table B: Disparate Impact Stratified by Education 
 




Non-College Graduates  
Men 150 200 350 0.43  
Women 115 180 295 0.39 0.91 
College Graduates  
Men 250 0 250 1.00  
Women 85 20 105 0.81 0.81 
 
Interestingly, the solution to the stratification issue may be the same 
one that Charlie accepts in Employing AI.  That is, the employer can defend 
by stratifying, but only if it can demonstrate that the stratification makes 
sense.58  So in my case, it would not make sense, for example, if the 
stratification to explain a difference in test scores was by height and, 
conversely, an education stratification would not make sense if the factor 
being challenged was a height requirement.  The appropriate rule would be 
that the employer can defend by stratifying only if the stratifying variable is 
closely related to the employer’s business interests.  Similarly, plaintiffs 
can use stratification offensively only if they can provide a reasonable 
explanation for why stratifying on the variable makes sense.  This is very 
similar to the rule suggested in Employing AI: a bare correlation between 
the employment practice and a business outcome is not enough to establish 
a business necessity defense.  The employer also has to provide a 
reasonable explanation for the correlation. 
This is where Susan Sontag comes in.  These two separate problems—
AI correlations and stratification—seem to have a similar solution.  Perhaps 
there is a theory in there somewhere.  Perhaps there is a general rule that 
statistical correlations should have legal significance in discrimination 
cases only where they are accompanied by a reasonable, normative 
explanation.  The problem with this, however, is that systemic disparate 
treatment discrimination depends on almost the opposite.  In the normal 
case, statistical proof of systemic disparate treatment occurs only if an 
explanation for a disparity is absent after accounting for other explanatory 
factors.59  So maybe there is no general principle, or maybe we just have 
 
 58  For a detailed discussion, see Paetzold & Willborn, supra note 50, at 387–97. 
 59  The seminal case phrases it in precisely those terms: 
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not yet found our Susan Sontag to make sense of these potato peels. 
VI.  THE TURN TOWARDS MERITOCRACY 
Let us return to the main topic, Charlie’s Upside Down article.  The 
issue Charlie addressed in Upside Down was whether disparate impact 
should be symmetrical or not: should it be as available to White males as to 
the groups with histories of employment discrimination that the law was 
primarily intended to protect?60 
One thing Charlie says in thinking about this is that permitting 
disparate impact to be symmetrical would, as he puts it, “shift national 
employment sharply towards a meritocracy.”61  Since almost every neutral 
factor an employer uses would be challengeable by men or women, 
employers would need to justify (or be prepared to justify) virtually all of 
their employment practices.  This, Charlie says, would have a significant 
philosophical effect.  The shift would be from the standard anti-
discrimination approach of requiring employees to prove bad reasons for an 
employment decision to one in which employers would have to provide 
 
[A]bsent explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that nondiscriminatory 
hiring practices will in time result in a work force more or less representative 
of the racial and ethnic composition of the population in the community from 
which employees are hired. 
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 n.20 (1977) (emphasis added). 
The comparison between the two situations, however, is more fraught than I imply in the 
text, and I do not explore it extensively here.  In rough terms, in the disparate impact 
situation, the claim is that an employment practice with a disparate impact can be used only 
if it can be justified by a correlation with an articulable and positive business outcome.  
Similarly, one can stratify only on bases that are business related.  In the systemic disparate 
treatment situation, however, the question is quite different: absent discrimination, how 
likely is it that one would see a particular outcome?  Or more particularly in the regression 
context, after accounting for other factors, how likely is it that one would see a prohibited 
characteristic as a significant predictor of particular outcomes, such as salaries?  See Steven 
L. Willborn & Ramona L. Paetzold, Statistics Is a Plural Word, 122 HARV. L. REV. F. 48, 
56–60 (2009).  Thus, in the former a correlation avoids a finding of discrimination, while in 
the latter it results in an inference of discrimination.  One is direct, the other is inferential.  
On the other hand, the two situations may be the same.  In both, the ability to explain the 
employment practice or outcome based on business-related factors avoids discrimination, 
while the inability to do so results in a direct finding of illegality for disparate impact and an 
inference of illegality for systemic disparate treatment.  Susan? 
 60  Mostly since Charlie’s article was published, the issue of symmetry has received 
interesting scholarly attention.  See Bradley A. Areheart, The Symmetry Principle, 58 B.C. 
L. REV. 1085 (2017); Naomi Schoenbaum, The Case for Symmetry in Antidiscrimination 
Law, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 69 (2017).  Cf. Saul Levmore, Title VII to Tinder: Law’s 
Antidiscrimination Asymmetry and Occasional Market Superiority, 68 ALA. L. REV. 877 
(2017) (focusing on the law’s asymmetrical application to sellers and employers vs. buyers 
and employees). 
 61  Sullivan, Upside, supra note 3, at 1512. 
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good, business-related reasons for their employment practices.62 
Charlie does not attempt to quantify how many more policies would 
be subject to attack under a symmetrical approach, but the implication is 
that it would be a lot more.  But is that the case?  Just how should we think 
about how many more policies would require justification under a 
symmetrical disparate impact?  Would it be twice as many since now both 
men and women could challenge policies?63  Or are there reasons to think it 
would be fewer than that? 
Figure 2 was my first cut at thinking about this issue.  The horizontal 
axis is every possible pass rate for women on a particular employment 
practice from 0 percent to 100 percent and the vertical axis is the same for 
men.  As a result, the figure reflects each of the 10,000 (100 times 100) 
possible relationships between the pass rates of women and men.  The light 
blue area  with horizontal lines  is every cognizable disparate impact 
against men, that is, every disparate impact that satisfies the four-fifths 
rule.  For example, if the female pass rate is 100 percent (at the far right), 
then every male pass rate below 80 percent would be a cognizable disparate 
impact.  Similarly, if the female pass rate is 50 percent (at the middle of the 
horizontal scale), then every male pass rate below 40 percent would be a 
cognizable disparate impact.  And the same is true for disparate impacts 
against women in the purple area with vertical lines. 
In this way of thinking about the issue, four-fifths of all possible 
relationships between male and female pass rates result in a cognizable 
disparate impact and, conversely, one-fifth do not.  More to the point of 
Upside Down, Figure 2 illustrates that a symmetrical disparate impact 
doctrine would double the number of employment practices that would 
have to be justified.  Under a non-symmetrical doctrine only the disparate 
impacts against women would be cognizable: the two-fifths (40 percent) in 
the purple area with vertical lines.  Under a symmetrical approach, the 
disparate impacts against both men and women would be cognizable: the 








 62  Id. 
 63  To simplify the discussion, I’ve limited the inquiry to symmetry between men and 
women.  Obviously, Charlie’s article itself is broader than that; it also considers extending 
disparate impact to White persons.  And the implications are even broader than that. 
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Figure 2: Universe of Possible Disparate Impacts Against Men and 
Women 
 
The problem with Figure 2 is that it treats every one of those 10,000 
possible outcomes as equally likely.64  But that does not seem right, or even 
close to right.  Figure 3 presents another way of looking at it.  Figure 3 
plots the effects of the universe of employment practices on women.  The 
vertical axis is the number of employment practices and the horizontal axis 
is the disparate impact of the practices on women.  A test with equal pass 
rates for men and women is right in the middle of the horizontal axis and 
then the tests have a greater disparate impact against women as you 
proceed to the left and in favor of women (against men) as you proceed to 
the right.  For example, at 1.0 in the middle of the horizontal axis, men and 
women would have exactly equal pass rates, while at 0.2 on the left side, 
 
 64  The actual number of possible outcomes is infinity, not 10,000.  10,000 is the 
number of possible outcomes if one rounds each possible outcome to a whole number (100 
times 100).  But, of course, an infinite number of outcomes are possible within each of those 
whole numbers.  But 10,000 seemed more than enough to report for these purposes, and a 
bit more comprehensible. 
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the pass rate for women would be 20 percent of the pass rate for men.65 
The idea here is that employment practices are distributed across the 
figure in a normal bell curve.  Most of the employment practices are in the 
middle of the horizontal axis and, thus, have no disparate impact.  
Increasingly fewer practices exist as one moves towards either end of the 
horizontal axis where cognizable disparate impacts occur against women to 
the left and against men to the right. 
Figure 3 sets 1.0 as the median with a standard deviation of 0.30.  If 
this is how employment practices are distributed, only the shaded areas 
would have a cognizable disparate impact against women and men, 
respectively.  The shaded area for women is 25 percent of all the 
employment practices and the shaded area for men is slightly less than 
that.66  The rest of the employment practices—slightly more than 50 
percent—would not present a cognizable disparate impact and, as a result, 
would not have to be business justified.  Note that this is quite different 
from the 80 percent that would have to be justified if all disparate impacts 








 65  For example, it could be 20 percent of women and 100 percent of men passing or 10 
percent of women and 50 percent of men passing. 
 66  Figure 3 views the universe of employment practices based on their adverse impact 
on women, that is, it is a normal distribution based on the pass rate of women divided by the 
pass rate of men.  That means that a cognizable disparate impact against women occurs in 
the space to the left of 0.8, the space that includes all the pass rates for women that are less 
than four-fifths the pass rates of men.  Since the figure is plotting the impact on women, the 
pass rates have to be inverted to determine the point at which a disparate impact becomes 
cognizable against men.  Although 1.2 seems as if it should be the right point, the actual 
number is 1.25.  If women are passing at 1.25 times the rate of men, then men are passing at 
80 percent the rate of women (1.0 divided by 1.25 = .80).  If the figure viewed the universe 
of employment practices based on the adverse impact against men instead of against 
women, one would see the inverse of this figure, that is, there would be slightly more 
cognizable disparate impacts against men than against women.  A third option would be to 
plot women and men separately.  If that were done to reflect that men and women were 
affected in the same manner (rather than one in relation to the other), then each plot would 
have a cognizable disparate impact to the left of 0.8 and each would constitute 25 percent of 
all employment practices. 
  I chose this figure because it best illustrates my points visually and because it best 
reflects the notion in Charlie’s article that the issue is whether male claims should be added 
to the already well-recognized claims by women.  But ultimately, all lead to the same basic 
outcome. 
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Figure 3. Frequency of Cognizable Disparate Impact Against 
Women and Men | Median of 1.0 (No Disparate Impact); 0.30 Standard 
Deviation 
But consider two other possibilities within this framework.  First, as 
illustrated in Figure 4, it could be that the standard deviation is less than 
0.30 so that the tests are more bunched up in the middle.  Figure 4 has a 
standard deviation of half that of Figure 3 (0.15 rather than 0.30).  If this is 
the case, even fewer employment practices would present a cognizable 
disparate impact and be subject to business justification.  In this figure 
again, a cognizable disparate impact occurs only in the shaded areas.  
Those areas account for only about 9 percent of employment practices for 
women and men, respectively, so about 82 percent of all employment 
practices would not need to be business justified. 
 
Figure 4.Frequency of Cognizable Disparate Impact Against Women and 
Men | Median of 1.0 (No Disparate Impact); 0.15 Standard Deviation 
 
Alternatively, it could be that the median disparate impact of all 
employment practices is not 1.0, but instead that more practices have a 
disparate impact against women than against men.  Figure 5 is similar to 
Figure 3 in that it has a standard deviation of 0.30, but the median test leans 
against women and favors men.  Figure 5 sets the median test at 0.8 for 
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women.  In this world, half the employment practices would present a 
disparate impact against women and be subject to business justification, but 
less than 10 percent of the practices would present a cognizable disparate 
impact against men and be subject to business justification.  Recognizing 
symmetrical claims would increase the number of employment practices 
subject to business justification by about 15 percent, not 100 percent as in 
Figures 3 and 4. 
 
Figure 5.Frequency of Cognizable Disparate Impact Against Women and 
Men | Median of 0.8 (Disparate Impact Against Women); 0.30 Standard 
Deviation 
How should we think about the refinements of Figures 4 and 5?  My 
intuition is that both are likely to be true to some extent.  Employers are 
very aware of the possibility of a disparate impact lawsuit, so they are 
likely to shy away to the extent possible from extreme disparate impacts 
and, instead, try to construct their employment practices to be race and 
gender neutral.  This in fact is one of the recurrent worries of those opposed 
to disparate impact doctrine,67 although it can be done in non-nefarious 
ways.68  Since this is the case, the universe of employment practices over 
time is likely to tend towards neutrality, to bunch up in the middle of the 
distribution, to look more like Figure 4 than Figure 3. 
Similarly, there are a number of reasons to think that the median 
disparate impact is not 1.0 but instead leans against women.  For example, 
 
 67  See Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 643 (1989) (to avoid 
disparate impact claims, “the only practicable option would be the adoption of racial 
quotas”); Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 581 (2009) (if employers were permitted to 
discard test results too easily, it “would amount to a de facto quota system”); Watson v. Fort 
Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 989 (1988) (rejecting dissent’s claim that permitting 
disparate impact claims based on subjective practices would force employers “to adopt 
numerical quotas to avoid liability”). 
 68  Disparate impacts can also be minimized by careful and professional construction of 
employment practices. 
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some of the neutral factors may be a cover for discrimination (in line with 
one of the theories for the doctrine), or maybe the workforce (and these 
“neutral” factors) are structured on the standard male worker,69 or maybe 
implicit bias skews the tests. 
If both of these adjustments are proper—that is, a smaller standard 
deviation and a median skewed against women—extending disparate 
impact to White males is not likely to result in a large increase in the 
number of employment practices subject to challenge and justification.70 
But what should we make of analysis like this?  After all, it is all just 
theory.  By itself, it does not permit us to quantify the actual effect of 
expanding disparate impact to include Whites and males.  We do not know 
much about the universe of employment practices subject to disparate 
impact analysis.  We do not know the shape of the bell curve.  We do not 
know the disparate impact of the median employment practice.  All that is 
true, of course.  But in determining legal doctrine, we often have to make 
decisions in the absence of firm data.  Of course, it is better if firm data is 
available and we have become much better in recent years in developing 
and relying on good data.  But often, we still have to rely on our intuitions, 
as we probably have to do in this case.  And when we do, even though it is 
not ideal, it is better to inform those intuitions with a sensible framework 
for thinking about the issue.  And that is the value of an analysis like this. 
The additional important point for this symposium is that Charlie tees 
up issues like this, points out how and why they are important, and makes 
us think about them in new and perhaps interesting ways. 
 
 69  Similarly, it may also be that employers are more likely to attend to employment 
practices with a disparate impact against Whites or males because those practices are more 
conspicuous and appear more problematic against the norm of the standard male worker. 
 70  Another important reason to think expansion of the doctrine to Whites and males will 
not lead to a significant increase in the number of employment practices requiring business 
justification is that almost all practices are already subject to business justification.  The 
quantum leap was made by the Americans with Disabilities Act which recognizes a 
disparate impact if an employment practice screens out not only a class of individuals with 
disabilities, but also any individual with a disability.  42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6).  Given the 
variety of possible disabilities, this exposes virtually every employment practice to 
justification.  See also Gail L. Heriot, Title VII Disparate Impact Liability Makes Almost 
Everything Presumptively Illegal (U. San Diego Legal Stud. Res. Paper Series No. 19-421, 
2019). 
Of course, it is possible to play this tune backwards.  Every employment practice has been 
subject to a claim that it has to be business justified since 1990, and yet we see very few 
cases.  So maybe the threat that most employment practices will have to be business 
justified is mostly and only theoretical.  In the real world, the barriers to disparate impact 
(finding a lawyer, funding the case, etc.) may be significant enough to shield most 
employment practices. 
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VII.  CONCLUSION 
For more than four decades, Charlie has been a leading scholar on 
employment discrimination law.  Like many in the academy, I have learned 
much from him and, equally important, his work has caused me to rethink 
many of my own positions.  I began this article by saying that Charlie 
found it annoying that I asked him to be introspective about his own 
scholarship.  I feel no guilt about that.  His scholarship has forced all of us 
in the field to do the same thing about our scholarship.  And you know 
what?  I hope he continues to annoy us for many years to come. 
 
